

Expanding the Scope of a Just Peace: Environmental Sustainability, Justice, and The Foundations of a Pedagogy of Peace

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The core ideas put forth in this essay rest upon the proposition that peace education and education for environmental sustainability converge on the common ground of justice. It will be argued that this recognition of the common ground that peace and sustainability share urgently necessitates expanding the concept of justice toward a universal scope of moral consideration and a value-oriented conception of peace and global environmental justice.

Reconceptualizing and expanding the concept of justice includes exploring a number of questions such as: what are the defining elements of the idea of justice; how do individuals experience and exercise a sense of moral consideration and justice; and what are the pathways towards global peace and justice, where care and respect for the inherent dignity and value of all life, human and non-human, is imperative?

In the exploration of these questions the work of John Rawls on the many themes of justice provides a powerful framework. He conceives all persons as moral agents, possessing two moral powers that he identifies as rationality and reasonableness, or what Martha Nussbaum refers to as the capabilities of practical reason and sociability. These two basic human powers or capabilities, when actualized, enable us to be guided by a sense of justice in the conception and pursuit of our own good, as well as affirming the pursuit of justice as part of a good and complete life. Leading us to consider the further details of an expanded scope of moral consideration, the recognition of intrinsic value, impartiality and reciprocity are explored as inherent basic elements of both the idea and the application of justice.

Furthermore, given that reasonable moral regulation of rational individual interest is facilitated when individuals engage their capacity of ethical and moral inquiry, an educational process of developing and nurturing human potential that is dialogic, reflective, and transformational is central to peace and an expanded sense of justice. In this context, the ethical inquiry process of reflective equilibrium developed by Rawls will be proposed as a core practice of peace education that is consistent with the logical structure of ethics, the core normative criteria of justice, and the enlargement of the individual moral scope towards universal inclusion, environmental sustainability, and peace.

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Peace and sustainability as matters of justice

The idea of justice concerns the protection of the intrinsic value of human beings. Since violence constitutes a violation of human value and dignity, and peace requires the transformation of all forms of violence and the patterns of thought that justify and support them, peace constitutes a matter of justice. Numerous forms of violence exist, often articulated as direct, structural, and cultural violence (Galtung, 1969, 1990). Violence violates the dignity and intrinsic value of humans by turning victims into objects and thereby dehumanizing them.

Sustainability pertains to the preservation of the natural environment within which human beings live and require for well being. Sustainability is forward-looking, to the long-term quality of the natural environment. To damage the environment in such a way as to reduce its long-term quality is to harm the well-being of those who inhabit the ecosystem. This damage constitutes a basic form of violence—the sustainability of the natural environment is thus an urgent matter of justice. The destruction of the carrying capacity and health of the biosphere is arguably one of the gravest forms of injustice (Sachs, 2015; Snauwaert, 2017).

If the scope of justice is expanded to include all sentient beings, and if peace and sustainability are matters of justice, then the scope of violence should include the moral consideration of direct, structural, and cultural violence toward all sentient beings, including the health of their natural environments as urgent matters of justice.

The two moral powers: The rational and the reasonable

Moral agency is constituted by the possession of what John Rawls identified as the two moral powers: rationality and reasonableness (Rawls 1971, 1993a, Rawls and Kelly 2001). Rationality is the capacity for a conception of the good, the capacity to know one's own interests and ends, and to plan the means to their achievement. The reasonable is the capacity for a sense of justice. When one possesses a sense of justice, one is capable of ethically self-regulating one's ends and the means to their achievement. Thus, the reasonable employs ethical limits on one's choices. The reasonable also includes the affirmation of a higher order interest in being reasonable as a part of one's good.

These two moral powers are I believe essentially equivalent to what Martha Nussbaum refers to as the “architectonic” capabilities of practical reason (rationality) and sociability (reasonableness) (Nussbaum 1988, 1990). What particularly defines humanity is our capacity for practical reason and basic sociability. These two elements are architectonic, in the sense that they organize and animate the entire structure of human life (Nussbaum 1988, 1990). A human life is necessarily shaped by practical reason (rationality) and sociability (reasonableness), for a human being is “a dignified free being who shapes his or her own life in cooperation and reciprocity with others, rather than being passively shaped” (Nussbaum 2000, 72). What is distinctive about human beings is that we are capable of conceiving, planning, executing, and evaluating our choices. However, we do not exercise our capacity for own individual conception of the good life as completely separate individuals; what is also basic to our being is our sociability (reasonableness). Sociability is central

to our humanity (Nussbaum 1995). Nussbaum suggests, consistent with Rawls, that “[t]he good of others is not just a constraint on this person’s pursuit of her own good; it is a part of her good” (Nussbaum 2006, 158). The good life is a life guided by a sense of justice wherein the reasonable regulates and limits the rational pursuit of our interests. To be reasonable is as fundamental to our own good as is the rational conception and pursuit of our individual interests. To possess a sense of justice is to limit our self-interest out of respect and care for others.

The implicit basic elements of justice

The question of justice can be approached from many normative orientations and methodologies. As noted above, there are implicit criteria that constitute the defining basic elements of “justice” in general, that is, the normative criteria that constitute the idea of justice itself, regardless of its particular principled imperatives. Implicit in the idea of justice are three fundamental normative criteria: intrinsic value, impartiality, and reciprocity.

Intrinsic value

As a basic principle of international justice Article I of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that each human person possesses intrinsic value. The intrinsic value of our humanity exerts freestanding moral imperatives, the core imperative being moral consideration. Intrinsic value exerts the obligation of morally considering the good of others; it defines moral standing and thus consideration in the moral community. Justice entails the normative recognition of the intrinsic value of all human beings.

The ideal of intrinsic value is the common foundation of all modern political and ethical theories (Sen 2009). Justice demands that we “should treat each of them [human beings] as ends, as sources of agency and worth in their own right, with their own plans to make and their own lives to live” (Nussbaum 2000, 58). Human value in turn exerts moral claims. A being with intrinsic value, is due, as a matter of justice, moral consideration; such a being is a subject of justice.

Impartiality

Logically following from intrinsic value is the normative criterion of *impartiality*. Implicit in the idea itself of what is ethically right is the requirement that a choice be disinterested and unbiased. Self-serving choices do not qualify as ethical. Ethical choices and claims require justification—one must provide reasons that justify the choice. These reasons must be disinterested. “Bare-faced appeal to self-interest will not do” (Singer 2011, p. 93). An ethically justifiable choice must give equal weight to the interests of all affected. That is, a principle of impartial consideration of the interests of others is fundamental to an ethical choice. As Peter Singer points out: “It alone remains a rational basis for ethics” (Singer 2011, p. 109).

As Rawls demonstrates, justice should be understood in terms of the demands of fairness (Rawls 1971, Rawls and Kelly 2001). As Rawls suggests: “The fundamental idea in the concept of justice is fairness” (Rawls and Freeman, 1999, 47). “A man whose moral

judgments always coincided with his interests could be suspect of having no morality at all” (Rawls and Freeman, 1999, 54). To be fair is to be unbiased; fairness demands that we impartially consider the claims and interests of others. Commenting on this basic idea, Sen (Sen 2009, 54) writes:

This foundational idea [fairness] can be given shape in various ways, but central to it must be a demand to avoid bias in our evaluations, taking note of the interests and concerns of others as well, and in particular the need to avoid being influenced by our respective vested interest or by personal priorities or eccentricities or prejudices. It can be broadly seen as a demand for impartiality. (p. 54)

Fairness entails impartiality.

Reciprocity

Interconnected with the criteria of intrinsic value and impartiality is *reciprocity*. The impartial consideration of the interests of other beings entails reciprocity, in the sense that such consideration requires the terms regulating the ethical relationship between parties must be such that no reasonable person would have grounds to reject them (Rawls 1993b, Rawls and Freeman 1999, Rawls and Kelly 2001, Scanlon 2002). Reciprocity requires that we “arrange our common political life on terms that others cannot reasonably reject” (Rawls 1993, 124). All parties under fair conditions should mutually agree under fair conditions to the principles of justice.

These three normative criteria determine the scope of moral consideration. Recognition of the intrinsic value of all human beings, impartiality, and reciprocity expands the scope of moral consideration beyond the individual’s cultural group. Universal inclusion is an integral consequence of the normative criteria of intrinsic value, impartiality, and reciprocity, what Peter Singer (2011) refers to as the “escalator of reason.” In the assertion of justice rests normative claims that are not positionally confined within any particular cultural horizon. Intrinsic value, impartiality, and reciprocity know no cultural boundary; they apply universally to all human beings as presuppositions of moral judgment.

Expanding the conception of the basic elements of justice

It is argued below that the inclusion of sustainable development as a matter of justice expands the scope of moral consideration to future generations of human beings *and* to all present and future generations of sentient beings. From this perspective, the pursuit of our individual and societal rational interests should be regulated by the ethical imperatives of the normative criteria of intrinsic value, impartiality, and reciprocity and any principles that follow from them.

The possibility of an expanded scope of justice requires that the normative criteria of intrinsic value, impartiality and reciprocity be reconceptualized. In what ways is each criterion transformed by the expansion in scope? The Earth Charter is used below as an ethical framework that articulates and supports the reconceptualization of these normative criteria within an expanded conception of justice.

The Earth Charter is a declaration of fundamental principles for building a just, sustainable and peaceful global society. The Charter constitutes a true global ethic in the sense that it constitutes a cross-cultural overlapping ethical consensus; it is a mutual agreement between global citizens regarding the ethical imperatives of peace and sustainable development (For a more detailed discussion see Snauwaert 2008).

Expanded scope of intrinsic value

The recognition of the intrinsic value of all sentient beings expands the scope of justice to mandate the moral consideration, and thus moral standing, of all sentient beings. The basic values of the Charter are enumerated in Principle 1:

1. Respect Earth and life in all its diversity.
 - a. Recognize that all beings are interdependent and every form of life has value regardless of its worth to human beings
 - b. Affirm faith in the inherent dignity of all human beings.

This principle asserts the basic values of the ethical system of the Charter: that all living beings have intrinsic value (a value independent of their instrumental value to humans); and that all human beings possess an equal, inherent dignity. Each being is understood to be a “teleological center of life;” an individual living being is a “unified system of goal-oriented activities directed toward their preservation and well-being . . . an entity whose ‘world’ can be viewed from the perspective of *its* life (Taylor 1986, 79).” These two basic values constitute the premises of the ethical system of the Charter.

Principles 1 and 2 logically follow from these values. Principle 1 asserts *respect* for life and the inherent dignity of persons, and Principle 2 asserts *care*, “Care for the community of life with understanding, compassion, and love.” Respect and Care for life and human dignity are the two fundamental principles required by the Charter. The value of intrinsic value requires the principles of Respect and Care for life in general and for specific manifestations of life on different levels of relationship (e.g., on the human level, respect and care for persons).

The following Earth Charter principles articulate the right relationship with non-human beings:

1. Respect Earth and life in all its diversity.
 - a. Recognize that all beings are interdependent and every form of life has value regardless of its worth to human beings

The principles of respect and care apply to the relationship with non-human sentient beings, shaped by the recognition of the intrinsic value of all life forms. The inclusion of the natural world in the moral community is necessary for its moral consideration. What follows is the proposition that the construction of a broader conception of justice must be founded upon the establishment of criteria for the extension of moral consideration to all sentient beings. If an individual is deemed not to have intrinsic value, then that individual cannot in principle be a member of the moral community. The individual may possess

value, but it is contingent upon its utility to the members of the moral community. The strongest argument for the establishment of moral consideration is intrinsic value, for it establishes the inviolability of moral consideration rather than resting it on the contingent grounds of instrumental value (Rolston 1988, Rolston 2006, Hargrove 1996, Taylor 1986).

The consideration of sustainability also extends the question of intrinsic value to future generations. Do future generations of human and non-human sentient beings have intrinsic value, and are they therefore worthy of present moral consideration? This is a complex question, since such beings do not exist in present time. However, it can be argued that we do hold them in trust, and by doing so we acknowledge their intrinsic value and moral consideration.

Expanded scope of impartiality

An expanded scope of impartiality requires that the moral consideration of human and non-human sentient beings be fair. No being should be treated only as a means. All sentient beings should be treated with care and respect as ends. Therefore, human beings should regulate their rational choices that pertain to other sentient beings and the natural environments that support them in terms of a consideration of the interests of all affected beings, including future generations.

Expanded scope of reciprocity

An expanded scope of reciprocity requires that human beings place themselves in the position of other beings affected by their choices. Non-human beings are incapable of a reasonable rejection of others' choices; however, that fact does not negate the basic moral obligation of considering the effect of human choice on lives of sentient beings, present and future. It also grounds the obligations of respect and care, for given the universal imperative of self-preservation and flourishing no sentient being would voluntarily seek out pain.

The process of reflective equilibrium

There exists a reasonable plurality of methods of ethical reflection, ranging from the judicious spectator, open impartial scrutiny, reflective equilibrium, the categorical imperative procedure, hermeneutics, the maximization procedure of utilitarianism, among others. The process of reflective equilibrium developed by Rawls is one such method of ethical inquiry that incorporates the core normative criteria of justice discussed above.

Reflective equilibrium is a procedure through which one seeks coherence between one's considered convictions and one's principles upon due reflection. A historical example of the exercise of reflective equilibrium is Martin Luther King's strategy of social transformation; it employed the reflective process of uncovering and articulating the incoherence between the society's founding political principles and the social practices of racial segregation, calling for a shift in people's moral consciousness to bring into coherence their convictions and principles. In this process the individual reflects on the degree to which her principles cohere with her convictions. There is also a wide focus to the process. The individual consults the widest possible range of reasonable principles and their grounding theories (S. Freeman, 2007; S. R. Freeman, 2007; Maffettone, 2010; Rawls, 1993, 1999a;

Rawls and Freeman, 1999; Rawls and Kelly, 2001; Scanlon, 2002). As Rawls suggests: “The most reasonable political conception [of justice] for us is the one that best fits all of our considered convictions on reflection and organizes them into a coherent view (Rawls and Kelly, 2001, 31).”

Given that the normative criteria of intrinsic value, impartiality, and reciprocity constitute the implicit elements of the justice, they constitute the *basic considered convictions of a reasonable person*. Consistency with these criteria is a necessary condition for the justification of our principles of justice—our principles should be in reflective equilibrium with them. If a principle is inconsistent with at least one of them, then the principle fails to achieve justification. Rawls’s device of the Original Position models the three criteria in the form of equality as the contracting parties being symmetrically situated in the original position (intrinsic value), the veil of ignorance (impartiality), and reciprocity (mutual agreement) (Rawls 1971). Rawls’s basic conception of *justice as fairness* captures the idea that the principles of justice are just by virtue of being mutually agreed to under fair conditions defined by these criteria. Therefore, the three normative criteria provide the standards upon which reflective equilibrium and thus moral justification rests. The expansion of the scope of justice, including the expanded conceptions of the three criteria mandated by the imperatives of ecological sustainability, necessarily enlarges the parameters of reflective equilibrium.

A pedagogy of ethical reflective inquiry

The process of reflective equilibrium constitutes the logical structure of ethical inquiry; in what follows a pedagogy of ethical inquiry, identified by Betty Reardon as a core peace education methodology, is explored in terms of the structure of reflective equilibrium (Reardon and Snauwaert 2011, Reardon and Snauwaert 2015).

This exploration proceeds on the basis of a curriculum theory, articulated by Jerome Bruner (Bruner 1965), John Dewey (Dewey 1995 [1910]), and Israel Scheffler (Scheffler 1992 [1973]), that posits that the curricular and teaching focus should be the logical structure (including the forms of thought and inquiry) of the subject matter. This curricular theory places the teaching emphasis on understanding the structure of the subject matter in two basic ways: fundamental ideas and the nature of inquiry characteristic of the subject matter.

Fundamental ideas: Students learn the underlying principles that give structure to the discipline which is necessary for understanding the details of the subject matter, using knowledge for recognizing problems, and for understanding the relationships between ideas.

Reflective grasp of the forms of thought: Development of the analytic understanding of the forms of thought, including the methods of inquiry that are characteristic of the discipline. The teacher and student embrace the form of thought itself, entailing a conceptual grasp of inquiry and developing the capacity to formulate and explain its workings.

The three normative criteria of intrinsic value, impartiality, and reciprocity constitute the fundamental ideas of political ethics, including peace and sustainability as mat-

ters of justice, and reflective equilibrium is a method of ethical inquiry that is one of the characteristic forms of thought of political ethics. A pedagogy consistent with the logical structure of ethics, therefore, can be formulated as a pedagogy of reflective inquiry that mirrors the structure of reflective equilibrium. A full explication of the elements of this pedagogy is beyond the scope of this short essay, however, essential stages of the process can be identified.

There are at least five stages of reflective equilibrium:

2. Reflective inquiry into the student's considered convictions
3. Comparative analysis of prominent political-ethical conceptions of justice
4. Determination of wide reflective equilibrium between 1 and 2
5. Exploration of a possible overlapping consensus of principles of justice
6. Exercise of public reason

The first stage consists of engaging students in reflective inquiry into their considered convictions. This reflection includes consideration of the values implicit in the background political culture of the students' society, consideration of each student's comprehensive doctrine (religious, philosophical, metaphysical), and consideration and acceptance of the three expanded conceptions of the normative criteria of justice discussed above. The objective of this stage is for students to construct an initial understanding of their considered convictions upon due reflection.

The second stage concerns an understanding and comparative analysis of prominent political conceptions of justice—their core principles and justifying reasons. This analysis is essential for wide reflective equilibrium and begins with a reflection on initial, personal ideas about what may constitute injustice and justice, including an exploration of developed theories. The objective of this stage is for students to acquire an understanding of the range of potential conceptions of justice upon due reflection.

Stage three explores possible states of wide reflective equilibrium. The students engage in reflection on the consistency between their considered convictions, including the three normative criteria, and possible principles of justice understood in stage two to achieve an reflective equilibrium between them.

Stage four engages students in exploring a possible overlapping consensus of principles of justice. This stage requires dialogue and deliberation between the students (and a reflection on the current status of consensus regarding conceptions of justice in their society) regarding a possible commonality of principles among them. Through fair deliberation students attempt a possible overlapping consensus of a core set of principles of justice among them. The objective of this stage is for students to generate a fair mutual agreement and an initial understanding of a shared conception of justice.

The fifth stage engages students in simulated exercises of public reason through analysis and debate of current and historical case studies of policy debates in local, regional, national, international, and global contexts. The students apply principles of justice, both those affirmed individual and those mutually agreed in stages 3 and 4, as public rea-

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sons in the process of justifying particular choices. This stage can employ group projects in a process that articulates a policy position and justifies that position by using public reason. The objective of this stage is for students to develop an understanding of and skill in the exercise of public reason.

This pedagogical process employs the fundamental ideas of reflective equilibrium as a core methodology of ethical reflective inquiry, thereby providing a basic means for the achievement of reasonable citizens who are capable of exercising political and ethical judgment consistent with the imperatives of the expanded basic elements of justice, peace, and sustainability.

Conclusion

Peace and ecological sustainability share the common ground of justice. Recognition of this integral relationship urgently necessitates broadening conceptualizations of justice toward a universal scope of moral consideration of all sentient beings. It has been proposed that reasonable moral regulation of rational individual interest is facilitated when persons engage their ethical capacity of reflective equilibrium, an educational process of developing and nurturing human potential that is inquiring, dialogic, reflective, and transformational.

Reconceptualizing justice and pedagogical pathways towards inclusion of all sentient beings in the moral community brings peace and issues of sustainability under the umbrella of a global ethical perspective. This expanded perspective values the inherent value of all life, cultivating the human capacities and powers necessary for planetary well-being and flourishing in the present and in the future.

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